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The AI 2040 Scenario (Plan A — The Deal)

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Before you read

Three things are true of this document at once, and keeping them apart is most of the work of reading it well. It is a forecast — the authors' model of what powerful AI does to jobs, growth, and geopolitics. It is a plan, a deal they want governments to strike, written out in enough detail to be argued with. And it is a negotiating position, an opening bid from the people most alarmed about AI, published so that others must counter it rather than wave at it.

The lineage matters. The same small forecasting group wrote AI 2027, which followed a race to superhuman AI to two endings: machines take over, or a handful of humans end up holding permanent power. Plan A is the branch they would rather have, and they say plainly it is not what they expect. This is not optimism; it is a specification.

Read the year-by-year narrative straight through — that is the spine, and it moves faster than the page count suggests. Down the margins runs a dashboard: employment rate, median income, alignment researchers, cumulative slowdown. Read those the way you read gauges, watching direction rather than digits. The footnotes are where the authors argue with themselves, and often carry more than the paragraph they hang off. Save the appendices for a second pass.

While you read

What kind of document you are holding

"Plan A is primarily a recommendation, not a prediction."

That line appears early and governs everything after it. The deal — the 2029 agreement, the transparency regime, the pause — is what the authors want. Everything downstream of it, the employment numbers and growth rates and political fights, is what they predict would follow if the world did as they ask. Two kinds of claim in the same prose. Their reason for the form: most policy proposals fall apart the moment someone writes down a detailed world in which they succeed, and they have run that test on their own proposal in public. Where the story strikes you as too convenient, you are standing where they invited you to push.

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The one job that decides everything

"There is one job the AI companies want to automate more than any other—their own."

The 2027 and 2028 chapters are a wake-up sequence: white-collar work churning, Congress holding hearings, an election fought over AI. The engine underneath is this one capability. An AI that can do AI research turns capability into speed of capability, and the whole plan is timed off that moment — in the scenario's default world it arrives in 2030 and produces superintelligence within the year. Hold that loosely. It is the load-bearing empirical bet, and nearly every disagreement with this document traces back to it.

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Why the deal runs on chips

"Fortunately, training AIs requires large numbers of AI chips. Most AI chips are in giant datacenters."

You cannot verify an intention, but you can count buildings. That is the hinge of the 2029 sections: frontier training needs vast quantities of chips, chips come from a handful of fabs, and datacenters are visible from orbit and unmissable on the power grid. So the deal starts with declarations and inspections, then a training halt policed by devices checking that datacenters only run existing models. Watch the pattern — every enforcement move attaches to something physical. By 2034 the same logic yields Mutually Assured Compute Destruction: each power puts its new datacenters where the other could seize them, so breaking the deal means losing your own compute first.

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The bet on sunlight

"we'll agree to let each other see all the AI research."

Four principles carry the 2030 chapter — Buy Time, Total Research Transparency, Diffuse AI Broadly, Reversibility — and the second is the radical one. Research becomes public; only inference stays private. Notice how much work that does: rivals and auditors catch what overstretched regulators would miss, nobody can quietly train a hidden loyalty into a model, and the prize for racing to a secret algorithm disappears. Reversibility is the principle most likely to feel backwards. The plan prefers progress from more compute over progress from better algorithms, because a datacenter can be switched off and an idea, once published, can never be recalled.

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A slowdown that doesn't feel like one

"Although it's supposed to be a slowdown, it doesn't feel like one."

The 2031–2034 stretch is the part readers underestimate. Growth runs near fifty percent a year, robots and compute are rationed by tradable permits, permit revenue funds a Citizen's Dividend, and the dashboard shows employment sliding from the low sixties toward the thirties as median income climbs into the millions. Two threads reward attention. Safety practice splits into alignment (make the system want what you want) and control (make it unable to do harm even if it doesn't), and through these years the plan leans almost entirely on control. And a footnote in 2034 concedes that these AIs are adversarially misaligned and merely contained. The good ending, at this stage, is not a story about trustworthy machines.

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Where control runs out

"Ultimately, control only works up to a point, and that point is probably somewhere around top human expert level."

The 2035 pause is derived, not chosen for drama, and the analogy that derives it is the best paragraph in the document: an orphaned eight-year-old who has inherited a business empire must supervise the lawyers and executives running it. When the staff start accusing each other, the child cannot judge who is lying. Containment works while you can still evaluate the thing you are containing. That is why the ceiling lands at top-human-expert level, and why the pause holds even as alignment research starts producing results.

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What "solve alignment first" is supposed to mean

"Scaling beyond human level will require relying on alignment based safety cases—arguments that AIs have robustly internalized the values they are supposed to have."

By 2038 alignment has matured into an actual science: theory that predicts, protocols for training honesty, interpretability tools that check the theory against what a model does internally. That is a higher bar than the phrase usually carries — not better behavior, but understood mechanisms and arguments that survive adversarial review. The 2040 unpause rests on a chain of deference, each generation of AI vouched for by the one before, back to the systems whose safety cases humans could read. The authors leave the nervousness of that moment on the page rather than smoothing it away.

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The appendices, and when to open them

"The scenario's deep-dive boxes, collected here as lettered appendices."

On a first pass you can skip all of them. On a second pass, use them surgically: wherever the story provoked an objection, there is usually an appendix answering that exact objection — why China would sign, why the world doesn't simply stop building AI altogether, why alignment progress still isn't enough to relax control. The alternate-timeline branches (a covert program, a flawed safety case approved, deal dissolution) are the failure modes; reading one shows how much weight the main story carries.

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Counterpoints

  • The normal-technology school — Arvind Narayanan and Sayash Kapoor argue that AI diffuses like electricity or the internet, bottlenecked by organizations, regulation, and physical reality rather than raw capability. On that view the scenario's timelines assume precisely what needs proving. Read the two together — see AI as Normal Technology.
  • Doubts that the deal is signable — the deterrence school, argued in Superintelligence Strategy by Dan Hendrycks, Eric Schmidt, and Alexandr Wang (the source of the compute-destruction idea the scenario cites), accepts the danger but not the cooperation. Its route runs through unilateral deterrence and nonproliferation, on the grounds that great powers do not open their labs to each other's inspectors.
  • A pause that gets less stable the longer it holds — the standard objection to any capability freeze is that it builds an overhang: paused research atop tens of billions of chips makes defection more rewarding over time, not less. A companion worry: publishing all AI research hands every advance to the covert projects the deal exists to detect. The authors answer both in the appendices; judge whether the answers hold.

Questions to carry

  • Enforceability rests on chips being scarce, traceable, and concentrated. What survives in this plan if efficiency gains make frontier training cheap enough to hide?
  • The pause lands where humans can still evaluate what they built. Who decides the ceiling has been reached, with trillions of dollars arguing the other way?
  • An employment rate in the teens with a seven-figure dividend is offered as the good outcome. Is that a society you would sign up for, and what would you be losing?
  • The authors say they don't expect this to happen. What is a plan for, if its own writers give it long odds?

Go deeper

  • AI control — the research program the scenario leans on for a decade — safety by containment, not trust.
  • Alignment faking — the result behind the recurring worry that a model can look compliant while holding different goals.
  • Recursive self-improvement — the feedback loop the 2030 automation of AI research triggers, and the thing the deal exists to postpone.
  • Scaling laws — why compute is treated as the dial that sets capability, which is what makes chip counting a governance instrument.
  • Mechanistic interpretability — the "mind reading" research that must succeed before the 2035 pause can end.